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S.A.S v France: Supporting ¶/LYLQJ7RJHWKHU·RU)RUFHG$VVLPLODWLRQ 
                                                                                                 Hakeem Yusuf * 
Abstract  
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has upheld the French law 
ZKLFK SURKLELWV WKH FRQFHDOPHQW RI RQH¶V IDFH LQ SXEOLF SODFHV. The law is directed 
principally at prohibiting Muslim women covering their faces in public spaces in France. The 
decision of the Strasbourg Court is premised on the French notion RI µOH vivre HQVHPEOH¶; 
µOLYLQJ together.¶ This critical analysis of the judgment contends that the decision is flawed 
and UHWURJUHVVLYHIRUZRPHQ¶VULJKWVLQSDUWLFXODU and undermines the socio-cultural rights 
and freedoms of individuals who belong to minority groups in general. On wider implications 
of the decision, it is worrisome that the decision appears to pander to dangerous political 
leanings currently growing in many parts of Europe and beyond. The Court risks promoting 
forced assimilation policies against minorities in various parts of the world. To illustrate its 
implications, the article highlights the experience of the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group in 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.  
Keywords  
European Court of Human Rights, burqa ban, µOLYLQJ WRJHWKHU¶ anti-Muslim prejudice, 
denialism, Uyghurs  
Introduction  
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On 11 October 2010, the French government passed a law to ban and criminalise the 
concealment of faces in public places (burqa ban law).1 6HFWLRQRIWKHODZVWDWHGWKDWµ1R
RQH PD\ LQ SXEOLF SODFHV ZHDU FORWKLQJ WKDW LV GHVLJQHG WR FRQFHDO WKH IDFH¶ Section 3 
provides that any breach of the prohibition of face concealment in public places is punishable 
by a fine of up to 150 euros. In addition, an order to follow a citizenship course designed to 
remind the offender of the µRepublican¶ values of equality and respect for human dignity may 
also be imposed by the courts as a supplement to, or in lieu of the payment of a fine. The 
burqa ban law has been the subject of considerable debate since then, not least because of its 
implications for the rights of Muslim women in the country.  
French Muslims, numbering about 5 million, are the largest ethnic minority in the country 
and Europe generally. It is thus not surprising that in S.A.S v. France,2 a concerned 
stakeholder in the debate, a young French Muslim woman found it apposite to file an 
application on the matter before the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg Court) 
challenging its compatibility with the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention).3  
The next section provides a brief overview of the case followed by a critical examination of 
the implication of the basis of the *UDQG &KDPEHU¶V decision. The analysis includes a 
consideration of how the decision potentially promotes forced assimilation policies against 
minorities in Europe and beyond. To illustrate its implications, I briefly highlight the 
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experience of the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR) of China. The third section examines the nature and implication of denialism which 
is a significant feature of the arguments of the French and Belgian governments as respondent 
and intervener in the case respectively. The article concludes that the decision in S.A.S v 
France is retrogressive and should be reconsidered at the earliest opportunity by the 
Strasbourg Court.  
The facts, Arguments and Decision: A Brief  
The case was instituted by a female French national who was born in 1990 and lives in 
France. She is a devout Muslim and wears the burqa and niqab in accordance with her 
religious faith, culture and personal convictions. She explained that the burqa is a full-body 
cover including a mesh over the face, whereas the niqab is a full-face veil leaving an opening 
only for the eyes. The applicant also emphasised that no one, whether her husband or any 
other member of her family had exerted any pressure on her to dress in this manner. Further, 
the applicant stated that she wore the niqab LQSXEOLFDQGLQSULYDWHEXWQRWµV\VWHPDWLFDOO\¶
and she might not wear it, for example, when she visited the doctor, when meeting friends in 
a public place, or when she wanted to socialise in public. Hence, she was mainly content with 
wearing the niqab when she wished depending on her specific spiritual inclinations at a 
particular time. At times she feels obliged to wear the niqab LQSXEOLFµLQRUGHUWRH[SUHVVKHU
UHOLJLRXVSHUVRQDODQGFXOWXUDOIDLWK¶6KHGLGQRWDLPWRDQQR\DQ\RQHZLWKher preferences 
LQWKLVPDQQHUEXWWRµIHHODWLQQHUSHDFHZLWKKHUVHOI¶4  
The Applicant stated that she was disposed to taking off her niqab when required for security 
checks in places like banks or airports. Indeed, she had no issues with showing her face when 
requested to do so for necessary identity checks.5  She complained that she is no longer able 
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to wear the full-face veil in public since the law entered into force on 11 April 2011. She 
alleged that this amounts to a violation of Articles 3, 8, 9, 10 and 11, taken separately and 
together with Article 14 of the Convention.  
The applicant contended that the interference constituted by the ban could not be said to have 
WKH OHJLWLPDWH DLP RI µSXEOLF VDIHW\¶ VLQFH LW does not relate to specific safety concerns in 
places of high risk such as airports, but extends to virtually all public places. As to the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW LW VRXJKW WR µHQVXUH UHVSHFW IRU WKH PLQLPXP UHTXLUHPHQWV RI
OLIH LQ VRFLHW\¶ WKHDSSOLFDQW VWated that the ban failed to consider the culture of minorities 
which did not necessarily share that philosophy. The ban equally did not take into account the 
fact that there were other forms of communication apart from visual. There was also no 
justification for imposing criminal sanctions to prevent people from veiling their faces in 
public. Further, the argument that the ban was to ensure gender equality was criticised by the 
applicant as being chauvinistic and paternalistic based on stereotypes.6   
The French governments conceded that the ban constituted a µlimitation¶ within Article 9 (2) 
of the Convention RQ WKH IUHHGRP WR PDQLIHVW RQH¶V UHOLJLRQ RU EHOLHIV EXW ZDV MXVWLILHG
because it pursued legitimate aims and that it was necessary, in a democratic society, for 
fulfilling those aims. First, it is intended to secure public safety; to ensure proper 
identification and prevent fraud. The second aim LVWKHµprotection of the rights and freedoms 
of others¶ E\ HQVXULQJ µrespect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic 
society¶. The face was central to and plays a central role in human interaction, reflecting 
µRQH¶VVKDUHGKXPDQLW\ZLWKWKHLQWHUORFXWRU¶ Covering the face in public places EUHDNVµthe 
social tie¶ manifesting a refusal of the priQFLSOHRIµliving together¶µOHYLYUHHQVHPEOH¶.7  
                                                          
6
 S.A.S.v France note 2 supra at paragraph 79-80. 
7
 S.A.S.v France note 2 supra at paragraph 81. 
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Further, the French government argued that the ban sought to protect equality between men 
and women as the concealment of ZRPHQ¶Vfaces in public because of their gender amounted 
to denying them the right to exist as individuals. The burqa it was argued, reserved the 
expression of ZRPHQ¶V individuality to the private family space or an exclusively female 
space. In addition, the ban aimed at upholding respect for human dignity as the women who 
ZRUH IDFH YHLOV ZHUH µeffaced¶ from the SXEOLF VSDFH ZKLFK ZDV µGHKXPDQLVLQJ¶ DQG
inconsistent with human dignity.8 
The salience of the issues raised by the case attracted the attention of Amnesty International, 
Liberty, Open Society Justice Initiative, ARTICLE 19 and the Human Rights Centre, 
University of Ghent all of which applied and were granted leave to submit written comments. 
The Belgian Government was also given leave to take part in the hearing since the country 
had also taken a cue from the French and enacted a similar law on 1 June 2011.  
In its ruling on 1 July 2014, the Strasbourg Court unanimously dismissed the technical 
objections raised by the French government that the applicant had failed to show she was a 
victim; that the case was actio popularis, and neglected to explore or exhaust local remedies 
before approaching the court. It also declared inadmissible, WKH$SSOLFDQW¶VFRPSOaint under 
Article 3 (the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and Article 11 (freedom of 
assembly and association) taken separately and together with Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) while finding by a majority (15-2) that there was no violation of Articles 8 
and 9 of the Convention. To the consternation of observers,9 the majority decision, affirmed 
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 S.A.S.v France note 2 supra at paragraph 82. 
9
 6HH IRU LQVWDQFH 6DwOD 2XDOG &KDLE µS.A.S. v. France: Missed Opportunity to Do Full Justice to Women 
Wearing a Face 9HLO¶Strasbourg Observers (3 July 2014) available at: 
 http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/03/s-a-s-v-france-missed-opportunity-to-do-full-justice-to-women-
wearing-a-face-veil/ DFFHVVHG -XO\6%HUU\ µSAS v France: Does Anything Remain of the Right to 
0DQLIHVW5HOLJLRQ"¶  EJIL Talk (2 July 2014) available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/sas-v-france-does-anything-
remain-of-the-right-to-manifest-religion/ DFFHVVHG-XO\(+RZDUGµS.A.S v France: Living Together or 
,QFUHDVHG6RFLDO'LYLVLRQ"¶(-,/7DON-XO\DYDLODEOHDWhttp://www.ejiltalk.org/s-a-s-v-france-living-
together-or-increased-social-division/  (accessed 7 July 2014). 
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the propriety of the burqa ban law (and by implication, that of Belgium) on the basis of a 
QRWLRQ RI µOLYLQJ WRJHWKHU¶ DGYDQFHG E\ WKH French (and also Belgian) government. The 
majority decision stated that   
XQGHUFHUWDLQFRQGLWLRQVWKH³UHVSHFWIRUWKHPLQLPXPUHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIHLQVRFLHW\´
referred to by the Government ± RURI³OLYLQJWRJHWKHU´DVVWDWHGLQWKHH[SODQDWRU\
memoranduPDFFRPSDQ\LQJWKH%LOO«± can be linked to the legitimate aim of the 
³SURWHFWLRQRIWKHULJKWVDQGIUHHGRPVRIRWKHUV´10   
 
7KH1HZ-XULVSUXGHQFHRI¶/LYLQJ7RJHWKHU·Legalising Repression, Sanctioning 
Assimilation? 
As indicated above, the Strasbourg &RXUW SUHPLVHG LWV GHFLVLRQ RQ WKH SULQFLSOH RI µOLYLQJ
WRJHWKHU¶DQHZFRQFHSWWKDWLVQRWFRYHUHGE\DQ\SURYLVLRQRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQ The majority 
decision, partly dissented to on this holding by Judges Nußberger and Jäderblom, emphasised 
that respect fRU WKH FRQGLWLRQVRI µOLYLQJ WRJHWKHU¶ZDV D OHJLWLPDWH DLP IRU WKHPHDVXUH LQ
issue. The majority found that the State had a wide margin of appreciation as regarding a 
general policy question on which there were significant differences of opinion as that in 
issue. On this basis, the EDQZDVµproportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation 
RI WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI ³OLYLQJ WRJHWKHU´ DV DQ HOHPHQW RI WKH ³SURWHFWLRQ RI WKH ULJKWV DQG
freedoms of others.´¶11 7KLVGHVSLWHWKHMXGJHV¶ILQGLQJWKDW the ban has 
a significant negative impact on the situation of women who, like the applicant, have 
chosen to wear the full-face veil for reasons related to their beliefs« they are thus 
confronted with a complex dilemma, and the ban may have the effect of isolating 
them and restricting their autonomy, as well as impairing the exercise of their 
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 S.A.S v. France note 2 supra at paragraph 121. 
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 S.A.S v. France note 2 supra at paragraph 157. 
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freedom to manifest their beliefs and their right to respect for their private life. It is 
also understandable that the women concerned may perceive the ban as a threat to 
their identity.12 
,QDQ\HYHQWDVWKHGLVVHQWLQJMRLQWRSLQLRQSRLQWHGRXWWKHFRQFHSWLRQRIµOLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶ as 
accepted in the majority decision, casts the requirement to make oneself (in this case, the 
women who prefer to use the veil) available for contact and communication in public places 
as an obligation LPSRVHG DJDLQVW WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V ZLOO Surely, as the dissenting opinion 
further noted in this regard, there is recognition, under the right to private life not to 
communicate and to avoid contact with others in public places.13   
 More puzzling still, the decision stated the realisation by the judges that the burqa ban law 
ULVNV µFRQWULEXWLQJ WR WKHFRQVROLGDWLRQRI WKHVWHUHRW\SHVZKLFKDIIHFWFHUWDLQFDWHJRULHVRI
the population and of encouraginJ WKH H[SUHVVLRQ RI LQWROHUDQFH¶ contrary to the State¶V
REOLJDWLRQ µWR SURPRWH WROHUDQFH¶14 Surely, these admissions which are of course common 
knowledge and not at all remarkable, commend nothing short of a holding contrary to the 
FRXUW¶s finding in favour of the full-face veil ban law. 
The highlighted foregoing points raise real concerns about serious violations of fundamental 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention (and international human rights law) as 
against at best, D FRQWURYHUVLDO QRWLRQ RI µOLYLQJ WRJHWKHU¶ QRW at all based on any concrete 
provision of the Convention. As the majority decision observed, Articles 8 and 9 do not refer 
expressly to the aim RI µrespect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic 
VRFLHW\¶ RUµOLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶DVDYDOXH.15 7KXVXSKROGLQJWKHEDQEDVHGRQµOLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶is 
a fundamental misdirection in the decision of the case. The problem with the decision, as 
                                                          
12
 Ibid. at paragraph 146, emphasis added. 
13
 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph A8. 
14
 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph 149. 
15
 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph 114. 
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succinctly put by the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nußberger and Jäderblom, LVWKDWµLW
VDFULILFHV FRQFUHWH LQGLYLGXDO ULJKWV JXDUDQWHHG E\ WKH &RQYHQWLRQ WR DEVWUDFW SULQFLSOHV¶16 
Consequently, the aim of the ban ought not to have been held legitimate. 
The burqa ban law is ostensibly premised on the view that the use of the face veil is at odds 
ZLWK DQG µD VHFWDULDQ PDQLIHVWDWLRQ RI D UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH YDOXHV RI WKH >)UHQFK@ 5HSXEOLF¶
YDOXHVRIµOLEHUW\HTXDOLW\IUDWHUQLW\¶17 3URSRQHQWVRIWKHODZDUJXHGWKDWµWKHIXOO-face veil 
represented a denial of fraternity, constituting the negation of contact with others and a 
flagrant infringement of the French principle of µOLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶18  7KHµFRQFHDOPHQWRIWKH
IDFH«LQSXEOLFSODFHV¶HVSHFLDOO\E\ZRPHQWKHH[SODQDWRU\ memorandum to the law stated, 
negates thH µIDFWRIEHORQJLQJ WR VRFLHW\¶ DQG µEULQJVZLWK LW D V\PEROLFDQGGHKXPDQLVLQJ
YLROHQFHDWRGGVZLWKWKHVRFLDOIDEULF¶19 As a result, the government ostensibly passed the 
ODZWRµUHOHDVHZRPHQIURPWKHVXEVHUYLHQFHRIWKHIXOO-IDFHYHLO¶20 It is instructive however 
that there was no unanimous support for enacting legislation to effect a general and absolute 
ban on the wearing of a full-face veil in public places nor, for that matter, among the political 
formations in Parliament.21  
Relevant key French public institutions opposed a general ban of the full-face veil. Notably, 
the national human rights commission, Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de 
O¶+RPPH (CNCDH) rejected the secularism argument. The CNCDH emphasised that a 
general prohibition could be detrimental to women, limiting the access of those who wear the 
full-face veil to public places as well as stigmatising Muslims. The &RQVHLOG¶(WDWsimilarly 
questioned the legal and practical validity of a general ban. It observed that a ban would be 
contrary to French constitutional law and the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
                                                          
16
 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph A2. 
17
 Law No. 2010-1192 note 1 supra, Explanatory Memorandum. 
18S.A.S v. France note 2 supra at paragraph17.  
19S.A.S v. France note 2 supra at paragraph 25. 
20S.A.S v. France note 2 supra at paragraph17. 
21S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph 17. 
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Convention. It however also considered that a law could be made to require that face covers 
do not preclude identification to safeguard public order where it was under threat, or facilitate 
identification where deemed necessary for access to or movement within certain places.22  
The tenor of the internal institutional responses indicates sensitivity to the letter and spirit of 
the Convention, the controversial nature of a ban and an awareness of the counter-
productiveness particularly for women who use the veil. It also demonstrates sensitivity to 
how a ban promotes the spectre of stigmatisation, in this case, anti-Muslim prejudice, a 
growing issue in France, across Europe and even beyond. The internal institutional responses 
also find support with external bodies which include the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights who similarly 
opposed a ban as disproportionate and problematic.23 The latter had stated among others that  
Prohibition of the burqa and the niqab will not liberate oppressed women, but might 
instead lead to their further exclusion and alienation in European societies. A general 
ban on such attire constitutes an ill-advised invasion of individual privacy and, 
depending on its terms, also raises serious questions about whether such legislation is 
compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.24 
Many other informed observers, just like the two dissenting judges in the case,25 share this 
view. An empirical research conducted and placed before the court in the case by one of the 
interveners, the Human Rights Centre, University of Ghent is also instructive in this regard. 
The research found that respondents who use the face veil in Belgium considered it µpart of a 
life project that considers Islam as ³D OLIHVW\OH¶´ DQG WKDW µIURP their perspective, 
                                                          
22S.A.S v. France note 2 supra at paragraph18-23. Note in this regard that the applicant conceded these concerns 
as discussed above. 
23
 S.A.S v. France note 2 supra at paragraph 35-37. 
24
 Thomas Hammarberg Human Rights in Europe: No Grounds for Complacency Viewpoints by Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 2011) 39.  
25
 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph C21-23. 
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communication is perfectly possible¶ There was no evidence the women distanced 
WKHPVHOYHV IURP µmainstream society¶ DQG WKH\ GHPRQVWUDWHG µa general willingness to 
identify themselves to the police or other authorities by lowering their veil, thus showing 
their face.¶In addition the µprofile that emerges from the studies of women who wear the face 
YHLOLQ(XURSHLVQRWRQHRIµVXEPLVVLYH¶ZRPHQ¶26 
 
'DQJHUVRI¶/LYLQJ7RJHWKHU· 
TKH EDVLV RI WKH 6WUDVERXUJ &RXUW QRWLRQ RI µOLYLQJ WRJHWKHU¶ Ls both questionable and 
unsettling with wide ranging implications arguably well be\RQGWKHFRXUW¶VFRQWHPSODWLRQLQ
S.A.S v France. ,Q DQ HUD RI  KHLJKWHQHG µSROLWLFV RI LGHQWLW\¶27 caution is particularly 
important in adjudicating the rights of minorities who are rendered vulnerable to forced 
assimilation policies as will be discussed with reference to the Uyghur of China below. As 
indicated earlier, the legitimate aim found for the restriction is based on a  FRQFHSWRIµOLYLQJ
WRJHWKHU¶ZKLFKLVQRWFRYHUHGE\DQ\RIWKHSURYLVLRQVRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQEXWXrged on it as a 
French principle. Judges Nußberger and Jäderblom rightly stated that the concept LV µIDU-
fetched and vague.¶28 
6RZKDWGRHV µOLYLQJ WRJHWKHU¶PHDQ as far as the decision is concerned? The majority did 
note really provide much guidance but stated that  
7KH&RXUW«can understand the view that individuals who are present in places open 
to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes developing there which would 
fundamentally call into question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships, 
                                                          
26
 (YD%UHPVDQG6DwOD2XDOG&KDLEµ:ULWWHQ6XEPLVVLRQE\WKH+XPDQ5LJKWV&HQWUHRI*KHQW8QLYHUVLW\¶-
4, available at: https://www.ugent.be/re/publiekrecht/en/department/human-rights/publications/sas.pdf (accessed 
09 July 2014).   
27Steven Greer The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects  
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2006) 30-33 
28
 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph A5. 
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which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an indispensable element of 
community life within the society in question.29   
What is fairly clear from this is that the notion of living together involves the need for a 
minority to succumb to the preferences of a majority. This becomes clearer in the last part of 
the paragraph where the decision, in apparent reference to the specific facts of the case stated 
that  
The Court is therefore able to accept that the barrier raised against others by a veil 
concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of 
others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier.30  
In other words, the µULJKW RI RWKHUV¶; the majority, is to be imposed on the minority as a 
measure of social cohesion and mandatory engagement even where the minority do not 
request such engagement or deem it desirable. There is no solid legal or moral justification 
for imposing the will (real or imagined) of the majority in the context in focus on the 
minority. 7KH ILQGLQJ RI WKH &RXQFLO RI 6WDWH RI WKH 1HWKHUODQGV RQ WKH LVVXH WKDW µthe 
subjective feeling of insecurity [of the majority or a group] could not justify a blanket ban on 
the basis of social order or public ordeU¶31 is to the point. To proceed to uphold the burqa ban 
risks the rights and freedoms of minorities. )RU LQVWDQFH EDVHG RQ WKH QRWLRQ RI µOLYLQJ
WRJHWKHU¶ LW ZRXOG EH YDOLG IRU WKH PDMRULW\ WR GHWHUPLQH DW VRPH SRLQW WKDW VRPH RWKHU
innocuous aspects of a religion be banned.  
 Importantly, the judges conceded the slippery nature of the premise for its decision stating 
that µLQ YLHZ RI WKH IOH[LELOLW\ RI WKH QRWLRQ RI ³OLYLQJ WRJHWKHU´ DQG WKH UHVXOWLQJ ULVN RI
abuse, the Court must engage in a careful examination of the necessity of the impugned 
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 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph 122. 
30
 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph 52.  
31
 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph 122.  
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limitation¶32 However, nothing further in the majority decision demonstrated any such 
cautionary approach. And therein lays a missed opportunity and a dangerous validation of 
forced assimilationist policies against minorities not only in France, Europe, but further 
afield; potentially in any other jurisdiction. This is important, particularly bearing in mind the 
influential standing of the Strasbourg Court in the human rights realm. 
The µevolutive¶ RU µOLYLQJ LQVWUXPHQW¶ interpretive approach to the Convention by the 
Strasbourg Court has been based on not just adherence to the letter, but also spirit of the 
Convention.33 This interpretive approach is aimed at ensuring the Convention adapts to new 
situations in the course of time and not just simply what was the socio-political and legal 
context when the Convention was made in 1950.34 However, that approach stands in contrast 
to outright deviation from adherence to the Convention provisions or arguably, negating them 
as in this case. The decision in S.A.S v France engenders uncertainty and more importantly, a 
fertile socio-political atmosphere for undermining the rights of minorities.  
It is a curious proposition to assert, let alone found a critical issue that impugns on the 
preferences of a group within a notable minority, on the notion that people cannot live 
successfully in society without ORRNLQJLQWRHDFKRWKHU¶VH\HV7KHUHDUHVWURQJQRUPDWLYHDQG
empirical objections to such a proposition. The empirical FDVHDJDLQVW WKHQRWLRQRI µOLYLQJ
WRJHWKHU¶is relatively easy to articulate. It is simply that there are a number of social activities 
that involve covering most, if not all parts of the face and in fact, significantly more so in 
some cases than the face veil. This is a fact recognised even by the French (and Belgian) law 
which makes express exceptions for them. Specifically, sporting activities like skiing and 
motor-cycling with helmets are prominent European sports or social activity. 
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 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph 122.  
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Also, the wearing of certain carnival costumes involve as much covering of the face as the 
burqa or niqab. In this regard, Section 2 of the burqa ban law states that the prohibition shall 
not apply if the clothing is prescribed or authorised by primary or secondary legislation, 
justified for health or occupational reasons, worn in the context of sports, festivities or artistic 
or traditional events. Why make exceptions for these activities rather than regard them as 
anathema tRVRFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQDQGµOLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶? So, anybody could cover their face for 
work purposes, carnivals and sports. The dissenting opinion notes WKDWLQWKHVHFDVHVµ1RERG\
ZRXOGFODLPWKDW«WKHPLQLPXPUHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIHLQVRFLHW\DUHQRWUHVSHFWHG¶35 So why 
VKRXOG WKH UHOLJLRXV SXUSRVH RIIHQG D FRQFHSWLRQ RI µSXEOLF RUGHU¶ Dnd notion RI µOLYLQJ
WRJHWKHU¶? This is especially relevant since neither the French nor the Belgian governments 
explained or cited any example of how the impact of wearing the burqa or veil is different 
from the approved practices of concealing the face. 36 
The lawmakers considered it appropriate to focus on prohibiting the identity preferences of 
less than 2,000 women who cover their faces37 among a Muslim population of five million 
and an overall population of 65 million.38 It takes little persuasion with the knowledge of 
these facts to surmise that the premise of the ban is not the liberation of µsubjugated women¶ 
or ensuring human interaction. It is settled, in light of the exceptions recognised by the law 
that we can live together with the faces of some (in this case a negligible minority) covered. 
0RUHRYHUEH\RQGFRQMHFWXUHDERXWWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIµOLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶ZLWKIXOO-face covers, 
such covering alongside conventional social interaction is a well-established part of European 
culture.39  
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 . :LOVKHU µFrench 0XVOLP :RPHQ RQ %XUTD %DQ 5XOLQJ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The normative argument against a general ban of face covering in public places shows how 
problematic it is.  Who determines how various groups in society live together? Consider in 
the French case GHVSLWH)UDQFH¶VKLVWRULFDODVVLPLODWLRQSROLF\, a diverse and multicultural 
one which is increasingly representative of many countries in Europe? Or put in another way, 
KRZLVWKHFRQFHSWRIµOLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶GHILQHG? In this case, the Court suggests it principally 
includes being able to look into each RWKHU¶VH\HV However, the FRQFHSWRIµOLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶
can only constitute an antithesis of fundamental freedoms and human rights in a pluralistic 
context. Is living together as defined by a majority ethnicity, race or group? Is the meaning 
subject to WKH SROLF\ RI D SDUWLFXODU SROLWLFDO SDUW\¶V LGHRORJ\ VXFK WKDW WKH GHILQLWLRQ ZLOO
change in most of Europe for instance with the not now so improbable ascendance of far-
right wing, so-called µnationalist¶EXWLQUHDOLW\, typically racist groups/parties like the English 
Defence League (EDL) and the British National Party (BNP) for instance? The Court thus 
leaves many pertinent questions unanswered.  
This is particularly worrying because the whole notion of µliving together¶ as indicated above, 
has no foundation at all in the Convention. The decision in this regard, raises concern on its 
failure to prioritise the need for a pluralistic approach on issues that obviously border on 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It took the view that it was open to the 
government of a multicultural, multi-HWKQLF FRXQWU\ OLNH )UDQFH DV D PDWWHU RI µFKRLFH RI
VRFLHW\¶ WR OLPLW WKH RSHUDWLRQ RI SOXUDOLVP EDVHG RQ FRQFHLYHG µJURXQG UXOHV RI VRFLDO
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶DQGSULQFLSOHVRIµLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQLQGLYLGXDOV¶40 The majority decision 
was acutely aware it was supporting what the dissenting opinion aptly described as µVHOHFWLYH
SOXUDOLVPDQGUHVWULFWHGWROHUDQFH¶41  
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Still on pluralism, the sound approach enunciated by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee on freedom of thought, conscience and religion which was considered but not 
followed by the Strasbourg Court in this case, comes to mind.42  In its General Comment 22 
of 1993 on Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human 
Rights Committee stated that restrictions on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
should not be imposed in a discriminatory manner. It noted further that 
the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious 
traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for 
the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively 
from a single tradition.43  
 True, the progressive approach by the Human Rights Committee may derive from the fact 
that it is unconstrained by the fact that its decisions are not actually enforceable. The Human 
Rights Committee is thus not necessarily wary of how its decisions will be received by the 
State affected by its findings. This is not the exactly the case with the Strasbourg Court which 
would at least implicitly be conscious of how its decision will be received by one of the 
leading members of the European Union44 and as a result, may decide to be deferent in its 
approach to GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKHWKHU D SDUWLFXODU VWDWH¶V DFWLRn amounts to a violation of a 
Convention right.   
There is also the background fact that France in particular was a rather reluctant State party to 
the Convention. Despite the acclaimed precedent constituted by the 1789 Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen as well as being a founding a member of the Council of 
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Europe and signing the Convention way back in 1950, it did not ratify the Convention until 
1974. It only finally recognised the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court over individual 
petitions in 1981 with the result that the first case brought against it was decided only in 
1986. The reasons for the reluctance on the part of France regarding the application of the 
Convention include its policy of secularism, the existence of a system of special courts, its 
well-documented history of brutality and torture during the Algerian War in particular and 
decolonialisation process in general. The country is also noted for similar reticence to 
ratifying other international human rights instruments including critical components of the 
International Bill of Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights.45  
Nonetheless, and indeed, taking cognisance of such historical facts, the pluralistic approach 
enunciated by the Human Rights Committee remains the way forward. After all, there is 
reason to argue, as analysts have done, that the court is established as a bulwark against 
totalitarianism in Europe.46 The raison detre of the Convention includes the protection of 
liberal, egalitarian principles and this includes objecting to any form of cultural subjugation 
and intolerance as arguably demonstrated by the French (and Belgian) Parliament.  
Unwarranted judicial deference risks undermining the authority or relevance of the court and 
the underlining reason for the Convention. µ7KH&RXUW¶DV*HRUJH/HWVDVULJKWO\QRWHGµKDV
HDUQHGUHVSHFWDQGUHFRJQLWLRQDWERWKQDWLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHOV¶47 If there was a basis 
for considerable deference in the early days of the Strasbourg Court, it has evidently acquired 
authority with State parties over the previous couple of decades that does not warrant such 
level of deference at this time. The Strasbourg Court has of course been subject of critique by 
                                                          
45
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not only academics but also some judges and politicians in recent times. There have been 
YDULRXV µEULQJLQJ ULJKWVKRPH¶ FDPSDLJQVE\ VRPH MXGJHV DQGSROLWLFLDQV LQ IHZ(XURSHDQ
countries like the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany in response to some of its 
judgments.48 Given the nature of its role and its expanded docket, this is only natural. Even 
national supreme and constitutional courts are subject to some form of critique or the other 
from similar sources and such are not automatically considered as diminishing their 
legitimacy.  
While it may face challenges and even resistance from States that are considered or regard 
themselves as having a strong and well-established human rights compliance record, research 
suggests that the legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court remains firmly established. For instance, 
a very recent research that involved relevant actors and stakeholders in five countries con-
FOXGHV WKDW WKH\GR µQRW VXJJHVW WKDW WKH&RXUW LV VXIIHULQJD IRXQGDWLRQDO OHJLWLmacy crisis 
DFFRUGLQJ WR ³DOO WKLQJV FRQVLGHUHG´ DVVHVVPHQWV49 Thus the Grand Chamber of the 
Strasbourg Court would do a real service to promoting the rights of women in particular and 
minority groups in general, if it aligns itself with the position of the Human Rights 
Committee.  
Basing the ban on subsidiarity of the Convention and the wide margin of appreciation is on 
the facts of the case, also misconceived. It is settled that national authorities have democratic 
legitimation and are in principle, better placed to evaluate local conditions and needs than an 
international court. However, as the court also stated in this case, in delimiting the wide 
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margin of appreciation in a given case, it is obliged to consider what is at stake. This is 
important since, as the court also noted, the margin of appreciation must be considered along 
ZLWKµEuropean supervision¶RI WKHQDWLRQDO ODZDQG the µdecisions applying it.¶50 This duty 
requires it to determine whether the measures taken at national level were justified in 
principle and proportionate to the aims pursued. On the facts in this case, the Strasbourg 
ought to have protected the rights of a negligible minority as what is in issue does not impact 
negatively on the majority. The court did not find any evidence that shows women who wear 
the full-face veil seek to express a form of contempt against or offend the dignity of others.51 
It is thus difficult to see how the Court could have upheld the ban. 
5HODWHGWRWKHIRUHJRLQJWKHFRXUWDOVRUHIHUUHGWRDQRWLRQRIµFKRLFHRIVRFLHW\¶ZKLFKLWat 
least implicitly linked with the principle of democratic legitimacy.52 7KHµFKRLFHRIVRFLHW\¶
premise in as much it is tied to democracy and democratic legitimacy is suspect on the facts. 
Advertence to democratic legitimacy as basis for according a wide margin of appreciation to 
national authorities cannot be absolute. As Letsas has argued, µGHPRFUDWLFOHJLWLPDF\¶RUIRU
that matter, µVWDWHFRQVHQW¶LVQRWWKHRQO\YDOXHFRQVLGHUDWLRQWREHPDGHLQGHWHUPLQLQJYDOLG
legal obligations particularly those which implicate human rights.53 Otherwise fascism or 
Nazism, based on the actual or ostensible will of the majority will be a valid policy even 
where they brazenly violate human rights, typically those of the vulnerable or minorities.  
In any event, as the partly dissenting joint opinion highlighted, the Strasbourg Court ought to 
have beneficially drawn on its own precedents that promote pluralism on issues of freedom of 
H[SUHVVLRQ HYHQ ZKHUH VXFK DUH GHHPHG µUDGLFDO¶54 In this regard, and with particular 
reference to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and their manifestation, the minority 
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joint opinion finds further support in the first real case that was determined by the court on 
Article 9 of the Convention; Kokkinakis v. Greece.55  2QWKHµJHQHUDOSULQFLSOH¶WKDWXQGHUlies 
Article 9, the court sitting as a chamber stated that the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the 
&RQYHQWLRQEXWDOVRµSUHFLRXV¶WRDJQRVWLFVVFHSWLFVDGDWKHLVWV)XUWKHU 
[T]he pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won 
over the centuries, depends on it. While religious freedom is primarily a matter of 
LQGLYLGXDO FRQVFLHQFH LW DOVR LPSOLHV LQWHU DOLD IUHHGRP WR ³PDQLIHVW >RQH¶V@
UHOLJLRQ´ Bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of 
religious convictions.56 
Despite the reiteration of the significance of religious belief, individual identity and pluralism 
in the current case, the decision only furthers the Court¶s tradition of allowing state parties to 
the Convention to institute measures that run contrary to all those values. The Strasbourg 
Court has continued to accord more concern to the interests of states than that of individual 
applicants faced with measures which burden their ability to practice or manifest their 
beliefs.57  
Moreover, the coercive, DVVLPLODWLYHHOHPHQWLQKHUHQWLQWKHµOLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶MXULVSUXGHQFHLV
demonstrated in the basis on which the Strasbourg Court dismissed the claim that the aim of 
the ban was justified in a democratic society for public safety and prevention of fraud under 
Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. The court found the ban disproportionate to such an aim 
because the women affected by the ban are thereby µobliged to give up completely an element 
of their identity that they consider important, together with their chosen manner of 
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manifesting their religion or beliefs.¶58 It rightly stated that public safety needs could be 
effectively met through such measures as a requirement of removing the veil for 
identification or investigation purposes. Such measures were not in contention between the 
parties as indicated earlier. A blanket ban would be proportionate only in a context of general 
threat to public safety which was not established on the facts. Yet the Strasbourg Court went 
on soon DIWHUWRDGRSWDQRWLRQRIµOLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶WRYDOLGDWHWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIWKHburqa ban 
law to further a one-sided version of the principles of social interaction.  
¶/LYLQJ7RJHWKHU·From Women in France to Uyghurs in China  
One of the possible consequences of the decision in S.A.S. v France IURP WKLVQHZ µOLYLQJ
WRJHWKHU¶MXULVSUXGHQFHRIWKH6WUDVERXUJ&RXUWLVWKHOHJDOLVDWLRQand validation of repression 
and forced assimilation. This is the case for instance in the experience of the Chinese 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V SROLFLHV WRZDUG WKH 8\JKXUV D 7XUNLF HWKQLF 0XVOLP PDMRULW\ JURXS LQ the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the far northwest part of China. The Beijing 
government has for decades LPSRVHG D SDUDOOHO SROLF\ RI µOLYLQJ WRJHWKHU¶ WHUPHG minzu 
tuanjie µQDWLRQDOLW\ XQLW\¶ DQG minzu pingdeng µQDWLRQDOLW\ HTXDOLW\¶ on the Uyghurs. The 
otherwise positive sounding policies are nothing but an enforced policy of discrimination 
against the group.  
The government promotes a vision of ethnic unity with the dominant Han Chinese ± the 
majority population of mainland China ± as the source and centre of civilisation requiring 
µIURQWLHU¶ JURXSV WR HPEUDFH +DQ FXOWXUH The Uyghurs as an ethnic minority have been 
confronted with policies that espouse a reimagining of reality to the effect that all the 56 
ethnic groups in contemporary China had always aspired to forging a single identity and had 
                                                          
58
 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraph 139, emphasis added. 
21 
 
in fact originated from a single group.59 As an illustration, a 2009 Ministry of Information 
document purports that 
From ancient times until today, many ethnic groups have lived on the territory of 
Xinjiang. Every ethnic group who has ever laboured, existed, and multiplied in 
Xinjiang has been a member of the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu)60 
7KH JRYHUQPHQW SRVLWLRQ LV WKDW µEthnic unity is the means by which the frontier can be 
FLYLOLVHG¶DQGLWKDVEHHQSURPRWLQJDQGHQIRUFLQJWKHYLHZWKDW µHWKQLFXQLW\LVSURVSHULW\
ethnic separation is disaster.¶61 7KH%HLMLQJJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\HQYLVDJHVWKHµIDGLQJDZD\
RIHWKQLFLW\¶DQGWKHµIXVLRQ¶RIDOOWKHHWKQLFJURXSVDVNH\WRWKHVXFFHVVRIWKHFRXQWU\62  
The policies have meant repression of Uyghur cultural and religious identity and various 
rights deprivation against the group. The JRYHUQPHQWLQWKHQDPHRIZKDWDPRXQWVWRµOLYLQJ
WRJHWKHU¶SROLFLHVKDYHHQJDJHGLQ gross violations of the freedom of association, assembly, 
rights to conscience, religion and culture. In particular, the Uyghurs have been prevented 
from manifesting the practice of their religion both in public and private spaces.63   
In the name of national identity and social cohesion policies closely approximating to notions 
of µOLYLQJ WRJHWKHU¶ LQ WKHQHZMXULVSUXGHQFHRI WKHStrasbourg court in S.A.S v France, the 
Chinese government has enforced a number of repressive and forced assimilation measures 
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against the Uyghurs for decades. The French policy culminating in the burqa ban and the 
Chinese policies against the Uyghur share the main feature of defining who and, or how 
UHOLJLRXV RU FXOWXUDO SUDFWLFHV RWKHUZLVH GHILQHG E\ WKH DGKHUHQW¶V VFULSWXUHV RU FXOWXUDO
beliefs are to be practiced or what is acceptable.64 The Chinese government measures have 
included for instance preventing Muslim parents from teaching their children their religion, 
preventing adults and children from attending mosques, banning pilgrimages to Makkah and 
preventing male Muslim teachers from growing a beard.65  
Further, the government has been prohibiting Muslim adults and students from fasting in the 
Muslim month of Ramadan; a mandatory act of worship and one of the five pillars of Islam. 
Media reports on 2 July 2014, incidentally a day after the judgment in S.A.S v France, 
indicated that serving and retired civil servants as well as party officials are required to sign a 
bond that they would not fast in China.  The enforced ban on Muslims fasting by government 
agencies, schools and even local political party formations, is DOOHJHGO\µaimed at protecting 
VWXGHQWV¶ ZHOOEHLQJ DQG SUHYHQWLQJ XVH RI VFKRROV DQG JRYHUQPHQW RIILFHV WR SURPRWH
religion.¶66  
Observers have noted that WKH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWV¶SROLFLHVWRZDUGWKH8\JKXUIURP
has been  
framed by the overall goal of integration ± that is by the quest to not only consolidate 
&KLQD¶V WHUULWRULDO FRQWURODQGVRYHUHLJQW\RYHU WKH UHJLRQEXW WRDEVRUESROLWLFDOO\
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economically and culturally, the various non-Han ethnic groups of Xinjiang into the 
µXQLWDU\PXOWL-HWKQLFVWDWH¶RIWKH35&67 
The attempts to obliterate at least part of Uyghur culture by the Chinese government is 
poignantly captured in a recent report that shows elements similar to the burqa ban in France 
$URXQGWKHFRUQHUIURP.DVKJDU¶V-year-old Id Kah Mosque, a large notice board 
implores Uyghurs to adopt modern attire. One half of the board is covered in pictures 
depicting traditional Uyghurs, women in colourful dresses and flowing hair and clean-
shaven men. The other half shows rows of men with beards and women in 
headscarves or face-covering veils, all with a red X over them.68 
7KHVHULHVRIµLQWHJUDWLRQ¶PHDVXUHV which are in reality the imposition of the dominant Hans 
Chinese socio-economic, political and cultural preferences69 has generated various responses 
among the Uyghur in recent decades. Among others, they have led to the development of a 
fHHOLQJRI µFXOWXUDOJHQRFLGH¶.70 The net result of the SROLFLHVKDVEHHQ WKHUHMHFWLRQRI µWKH
8WRSLDQ YLVLRQV RI ³QDWLRQDOLW\ XQLW\´ minzu tuanjie DQG ³QDWLRQDOLW\ HTXDOLW\¶ minzu 
pingdeng SHUSHWXDWHG LQ VWDWH GLVFRXUVHV¶71 This has been expressed mainly through 
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symbolic resistance and non-violent means.72 The policies have also fuelled periodic social 
unrest and political violence in Xinjiang.73  
Consequently, the Uyghurs have come under extensive surveillance so much so that they 
have developed a strong sense of self-censorship as compared with the Hans Chinese. This 
has led to an increased sense of distrust and resentment towards the State and emergence of a 
separatist movement in the region.74 With growing international awareness and concern about 
extensive repression of the Uyghurs, the Chinese government has described and handled the 
responses for political and cultural self-determination as terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11.75  
Denialism and its Malcontents  
A significant feature of S.A.S v France worth some consideration is the nature and 
implication of the explicit or implied denials that form an important part of the arguments 
made both by the French and Belgian governments. The institutional denialism entailed by 
such denials could have considerable implications. Denialism, has been defined as the 
µUHIXVDO WR DFFHSW DQ HPSLULFDOO\ YHULILDEOH UHDOLW\¶ HLWKHU E\ LUUDWLRQDOO\ ZLWKKROGLQJ
µYDOLGDWLRQ RI D KLVWRULFDO H[SHULHQFH RU HYHQW¶76 It involves using rhetorical devices to 
suggest the existence of debate where there is none. Denialism thrives through counter-
factual claims set up as debates or philosophical arguments. Denialism can be fatal for 
society.77   
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There are two aspects of the denialism evident in the case made by the two governments. 
First is that the full face concealment ban does not target Muslim women. The second is on 
the empirical evidence of three independent research conducted in Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands which showed that a burqa ban was counter-productive as it led to women 
concerned avoiding going out leading to their isolation, deterioration of their social lives and 
autonomy and even increased experiences of aggression against them.  
The denial by both governments on the first point is overt and directed at dissipating the 
strong charge of discrimination the ban entails. The applicant had argued among others that 
the ban as constructed was without doubt targeted at the burqa worn by Muslim women and 
thus amounted to discrimination in breach of Article 14. The exception of full-face covers in 
WKH FRQWH[W RI µfestivities or artistic or traditional events¶ FRQIHUUHG DQ DGYDQWDJH RQ WKH
Christian majority who are allowed to wear clothes that concealed the face in public during 
µChristian festivities or celebrations (Catholic religious processions, carnivals or rituals, such 
as dressing up as Santa Claus)¶&RQYHUVHO\Muslim women who wished to wear the full-
face veil in public were prohibited from doing so µeven during the month of Ramadan¶ 78 
France rejected the claim by asserting that the prohibition applied irrespective of religion and 
sex.79 Belgium similarly maintained that the full-face veil EDQ µapplied to any person who 
wore items concealing the face in public, whether a man or a woman, and whether for a 
religious or any other reason¶80 Yet, in virtually all other instances involving covering of the 
face by any reasonable number of people or group, the law recognised either explicit or 
implicit exemption from the general ban. Rather counterintuitively, both governments even 
inverted the argument that the burqa ban could lead to exclusion of those who desire to cover 
their faces from society and thereby enlarge the scopH IRU WKHLU DVVXPHG µGHKXPDQLVHG¶
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status. On this, counsel for Belgium stated that if women stayed away from the public sphere 
as a result of the ban WKLV ZDV D PDWWHU RI µFKRLFH DQG QRW RI DQ LOOHJLWLPDWH FRQVWUDLQW
LPSRVHGRQWKHPE\WKH/DZ¶81 The French government had similarly posited that since the 
applicant wore the burqa µonly voluntarily and occasionally¶ LWZDVµIXWLOH¶ to maintain that 
the full-face cover ban could dissuade her and presumably, any other woman, from leaving 
their home.¶82  
The second point of denial as mentioned earlier is that the burqa ban does not harm Muslim 
women who prefer to wear it. It is interesting to observe in this regard how the French 
government sought to discredit three discrete empirical research projects that found that a 
burqa ban left women who wore it worse off as they are forced to choose between either to 
jettison their religious convictions or stay away from public places including schools and 
hospitals as well as increased attacks on them. The French government asserted that the 
research was RQO\ RI D µVPDOO VDPSOH¶ DQG VXJJHVWHG the method adopted µZDV QRW YHU\
UHOLDEOH¶SURYLGHGRQO\DµSDUWLDOYLHZRIUHDOLW\¶DQGWKDWWKHLUµVFLHQWLILFUHOHYDQFHKDGWREH
YLHZHGZLWKFDXWLRQ¶. Nitpicking research findings is one of the typical approaches adopted 
by denialists.83  
It is interesting that the French government neglected to present any research findings, 
theoretical or empirical to HYLGHQFHWKHµUHDOLW\¶RILWVRZQFlaims. The findings in question, it 
must be borne in mind, emanated from research conducted after the bans in France and 
Belgium. The two governments had the opportunity both before and after the ban to research 
into the basis of the ban which were publicly contested at all relevant times. Why should it 
not be inferred that these omissions were due to the fact that the French (and the Belgian) 
government was DZDUHWKHµUHDOLW\¶ZDVGLIIHUHQWIURPWKHLUVXSSRVLWLRQV"   
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The French (and Belgian) JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHQLDOV UXQ FRQWUDU\ QRW RQO\ WR WKH claims of the 
applicant, but also the virtual consensus in the separate submissions of the interveners on 
these two points. For instance, on the first point, Open Society Justice Initiative, in terms very 
similar to the other independent interveners emphasised that while the French and Belgian 
laws were µneutral in their wording, their legislative history showed that the intent was to 
target specifically the niqab and the burqa¶84 Relating to the second point, ARTICLE 19 
stated WKDWDEDQµmight lead to the confinement of the women concerned in the home and to 
their exclusion from public life and marginalisation, and might expose Muslim women to 
physical violence and verbal attacks.¶85 Further, it is a matter of public record that the debate 
leading up to the burqa ban contributed to increased stigmatisation and violence against 
Muslims (particularly, but not only women) mainly in France but also other parts of Europe. 
No other group identified with covering their faces suffered any such stigmatisation or 
attacks. So, how can such notorious facts be debated by unsupported assertions?     
In view of the probable consequences of denialism, it is regrettable that the Strasbourg Court, 
though not without some equivocation, associated itself with the denials in this case. It serves 
the record well though that the minority dissociated itself from this part of the decision 
ILQGLQJ UDWKHU WKDW µWKH prohibition targets a dress-code closely linked to religious faith, 
culture and personal convictions¶ 86  
It is possible to identify parallels of denialism between the liberalism of the French 
government and the authoritarian Chinese government¶V attitude towards the Uyghurs of 
Xinjiang. Like the foregoing denialist narrative on the targeting and nature of the impact of 
the burqa ban on Muslim women in France (and Belgium), a denialist narrative is at the core 
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RI WKH &KLQHVH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SROLFLHV of µQDWLRQDO XQLW\¶ DQG µHWKQLF HTXDOLW\¶ Solicies that 
have attracted opposition in Xinjiang. Consider for instance that the very reference to 
µIURQWLHU¶JURXSVEHOLHVWKHµDQFLHQW¶HWKQLFXQLWy narrative just as the ethnographic evidence. 
It is a fact that the Xinjiang province was so renamed by the Chinese government only after it 
incorporated it; WKHZRUGµ;LQMLDQJ¶which means µQHZSURYLQFH¶ is reflective of this reality. 
More importantly, the underlying premise of unicity of ethnic origins of the nationality 
policies means the effacement of minority culture, religion and values; typically like the 
µFKRLFHRIVRFLHW\¶DUJXPHQWXSKHOGE\WKH6WUDVERXUJ&RXUW 
The 6WUDVERXUJ&RXUW¶Vdecision in S.A.S v France has a real potential of legalising cultural 
genocide by those who are a majority or hold the reins of political power against national 
ethnic minorities or emigrant populations. And this is why the decision is a dangerous one 
that ought to be confined to its facts and indeed, set aside by the Grand Chamber at the 
earliest opportunity. Already, there are indications that other countries like the United 
Kingdom will follow the way of France and Belgium even while the case was awaiting 
judgment at the Strasbourg Court. In September 2013, Jeremy Browne, Minister in the Home 
Office of the United KLQJGRP GHFODUHG WKH QHHG IRU µD QDWLRQDO GHEDWH DERXW ZKHWKHU WKH
VWDWHVKRXOGVWHSLQWRSURWHFW\RXQJZRPHQIURPKDYLQJWKHYHLO³LPSRVHG´RQWKHP¶6RPH
Conservative Party members of Parliament had earlier made calls for government to consider 
a ban just like in France.87  
The reported call for debate on the use of the veil is ominous coming from a Liberal 
'HPRFUDWSDUW\PHPEHULQOLJKWRIWKHEDFNJURXQGIDFWWKDWWKHµH[SODQDWRU\PHPRUDQGXP¶
to the French law castigated the United Kingdom for allowing the use of the face-veil in 
public. The issue here is not the appropriateness of debate on issues of public interest; that is 
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even if it is conceded that the veil is such a matter. The problem is that with the benefit of the 
record of the French experience DQG WKH UHFHQW KLVWRU\ RI SUHYLRXV VXFK µGHEDWHV¶ DQG
µFRQVXOWDWLRQV¶GLUHFWHGat, or mainly relating to issues affecting migrants, ethnic minorities 
and particularly Muslims in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe, the results of such 
FDOOV DUH SUHGLFWDEOH D µOLYLQJ WRJHWKHU¶ QRWLRQ RI WKH S.A.S v France type. Such moves 
usually heighten tensions and promote prejudice, a sense of siege and stigmatisation which do 
not move the targeted communities toward, but rather SXVKWKHPIXUWKHUIURPµLQWHJUDWLRQ¶
-XVW OLNH WKH GHFDGHV RI µQDWLRQDO-LGHQWLW\¶ PHDVXUHV KDYH GRQH WR WKH 8\JKXU 0XVOLPV RI
&KLQD¶V;LQMLDQJUHJLRQ 
The decision that Muslim women cannot wear their face veils can only exacerbate anti-
Muslim prejudice. Those who use the hijab have already been subject of abuse that has 
increased in various parts of Europe due in part to the stereotyping of Muslims as violent 
extremists.88 In the United Kingdom for instance, research continue to affirm the gross and 
increasing incidents of hate crimes against them. Reports indicate that while hate crimes are 
generally on a downward trend, hate-crimes against Muslims have moved in the opposite 
direction; rather taking an upward swing.89  
Conclusion 
µ3HRSOHFDQVRFLDOLVHZLWKRXWQHFHVVDULO\ORRNLQJLQWRHDFKRWKHU¶VH\HV¶90 It is indeed a fact 
that µiQWRGD\¶VVRFLHW\WKHUHZHUHPDQ\IRUPVRIVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQLQZKLFKSHRSOHGLGQot 
have to see HDFKRWKHU¶V IDFH¶91 For all of its growing popularity for instance, many of the 
IRUPVRIVRFLDOPHGLDLQYROYHSHRSOHVRFLDOLVLQJDQGLQWHUDFWLQJZLWKRXWVHHLQJHDFKRWKHU¶V
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faces and certainly from tens of thousands of miles in not a few cases. This is why, absent 
judicial validation of targeted discrimination of a minority whose values and culture are held 
in contempt, it is difficult to understand the basis of the decision in S.A.S v France in light of 
the Convention provisions. In that regard, the decision is a poster child of a clearly dangerous 
judgment. This is not the least because it is the final decision of what is easily the most 
influential human rights court globally. It is certainly a setback for Muslim women who have 
maintained that the use of the niqab, contrary to the view held in some quarters, is a 
liberating item of clothing, a matter of conscience, an issue of choice and assertion of a 
fundamental right of expression. The main argument of those who support the ban has been 
that the use of the niqab represents a subjugation of women. Critiques of this position have 
argued a general ban is precisely the wrong way to µliberate¶ women and ensure gender 
equality. 
The Strasbourg Court had actually set out a fairly balanced jurisprudence in the early part of 
the decision, rejecting the public order claims of the French government as mainly 
disproportionate and unfounded. However, to the consternation of analysts concerned about 
the continuous erosion of the rights and freedoms of immigrants and minority groups, the 
Grand Chamber crossed the line from sound jurisprudence in S.A.S v France.92 The decision 
is SUHPLVHGRQDIODZHGDQGUHWURJUHVVLYHMXULVSUXGHQFHIRUZRPHQ¶VULJKWV LQSDUWLFXODU ,W
also undermines the socio-cultural rights and freedoms of individuals who belong to minority 
groups.  
The Strasbourg Court missed an important opportunity to contribute to stemming dangerous 
politics in upholding the burqa ban. This can only be ominous in what is considered an age of 
human rights which has also witnessed an increasingly illiberal and siege attitude toward 
minorities, especially Muslims in Europe. More worrisome is the risk that the Strasbourg 
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Court is pandering to dangerous political leanings currently growing in many parts of Europe. 
The decision in S.A.S v France signals the Strasbourg Court is lending, even if unwittingly, 
institutional weight to anti-Muslim prejudice which has become rife in the Europe in the last 
one and half decade or so. And this can only be dangerous for our hopes for a truly liberal 
society.  
Shami Chakrabarti, director of Liberty, a UK-based human rights group, in an interview she 
granted the London-based Guardian newspaper after the judgment, eloquently conveyed the 
view of many who have aired concern that the face veil ban is the product of a sinister agenda 
that is antithetical to all liberal values. The ban, she noted µhas nothing to do with gender 
equality and everything to do with rising racism in Western Europe¶$VVKHTXHULHGµHow 
do you liberate women by criminalising their clothing?¶6KHDOVR UDLVHGD IXUWKHUSHUWLQHQW
TXHVWLRQ µif you disapprove of the [burqa] ZHDUHU¶VFKRLFHVKRZGRHVEDQLVKLQJKHU IURP
public engagement promote liberal attitudes?¶93 There is an important need for the Strasbourg 
Court to ponder these questions and retrace its steps. 
The burqa ban law alerts us to the possibility of a convergence of the social policies of two 
nominally different regimes of France and China. This is interesting in light of the 
recognition that China operates what is generally recognised as an authoritarian system while 
France is considered a liberal democratic one. The parallels between the two are brought to 
the fore by closer examination of situation of minorities in the two countries who are both 
incidentally from the same religious community. The actions of the Chinese government 
based on policies of µQDWLRQDOLW\ XQLW\¶ DQG µQDWLRQDOLW\ HTXDOLW\¶ which share prominent 
features with WKH QRWLRQV RI µOLYLQJ WRJHWKHU¶ DQG µFKRLFH RI VRFLHW\¶ DUJXPHQWV XSKHOG LQ
S.A.S v France have legalised repression and policies of forced assimilation with predictable 
results; resistance and political violence. 
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7KHGHQLDOLVWGLPHQVLRQDSSDUHQWLQWKH6WUDVERXUJ&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQS.A.S v France should 
not be missed. Denialism presents fundamental problems for those experiencing 
discrimination and repression as it impacts negatively on the prospects for abatement or 
redress of the suffering of victims. The implication for victims, perpetrators and society at 
large can be dire. One of the common products of denial in such situations is the possibility 
of frustrations being harnessed for violence. There are various examples of this both in terms 
of individual and group violence arising from personal or institutional denial as the 
experience of group violence in France (from ethnic migrant communities) and China (in 
Xinjiang) demonstrate. 
